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I have read the story of the Kodak engineer many times and the "story" is that the engineer who developed the solid state camera was ahead of his time and that Kodak stopped further research and production of the camera.
Typically the story is depicted is that the development of the solid state camera would have been in competition with its film products.
It does pose three issues which won't be discussed in detail: (1) why did Kodak allow and pursue the research and development of a solid state camera and (2) why did traditional film camera manufacturers such as Canon, Ricoh and Pentax (later owned by Ricoh) pursue digital technology and (3) why did new entrants into the digital photography such as Sony and Panasonic enter into the market of digital photography.
Having worked in the broadcast industry, broadcast equipment manufacturers such as Sony introduced electronic news gathering ('ENG') equipment and telecine manufacturers such as Bosch using a charged couple device ('CCD').
Before the implementation of CCD techologies into TV broadcasting equipment cameras used 'vacuum tube' image sensors such as the plumbicon and image orthicon ('IO') tubes. These devices especially the IO tube tended to be large compared to the CCD image sensor.
CCD sensors were available as a single line or 'matrix' of sensors.
By the 1980s, CCD sensors were getting cheaper such that all broadcast and domestic video equipment have CCD sensors instead of plumbicon and IO tubes.
In the 1970s, CCD sensors were very expensive and had a lower resolution and the means to store high resolution pictures were not in abundance.
As a result, Kodak in the mid 1970s may not have had the means to secure and purchase a reliable source of high resolution CCDs in economic numbers such that the solid state camera may have been a reasonable. In addition, the means to store high-resolution photographs may not have been available.
That's unless Kodak could have pursued the production of video cameras for use in broadcast for 1" and 2" reel-to-reel machines and for u-matic, vhs and beta for domestic and education purchases.
Was it wise for Kodak to abandon the production of solid state cameras? If the availability of securing cheaper CCD devices due to the economies of scale of production of CCD devices, it would have been wiser for Kodak to pursue solid state analogue video cameras because of the ability to store information on video tape. Kodak should have setup an additional marketing division without the name Kodak. For storage of still photographs, for which solid state cameras would have been possible save for a method of storing still photographs.
Consequently, the method of producing a solid state camera for the recording of still photographs should have been delayed but not abandonded by Kodak until CCDs and the method of storing still pictures on a storage device was cheaper.
Kodak should have kept an 'eye' on the possible competing solid state technologies and entered while observing the economies of scale on CCD and storage devices.
Yet Kodak was not the only film company to decline with a corresponding increase in sales of solid state photography. Agfa was bankrupt in 2004, dropping consumer film products and film cameras to morph into health care imaging information systems. If your doctor ever referred you to have an x-ray or other health imaging, the resultant images are likely to have been printed on photographic paper rather than film.
The 1974 policy of Kodak of not pursuing solid state recording of images may have been wise, but may have been dumb in abandoning and not pursuing the technology until it was the right time to develop a solid state camera considering the practicalities for the economies of scale in higher quality CCDs and the method of storage of still images.
Kodak and Agfa should have kept an eye on the technologies for image capture and storage in the same way that Edison cylinders gave way for 78rpm shellac which gave way for 45rpm and 33.333333rpm vinyl and cassettes giving way to CD and downloads.
Having said that, it should not detract from the main topic of radio programming and whether there is an available market for the "product/service".
The two issues is (1) how audio programs are consumed and (2) whether national corporate branding of radio stations can be applied nationally.
First, with the advent of streaming downloads, people are consuming music content which is not necessarily the same as those broadcast on radio. Then the consumer's taste is not restricted to a particular genre of a particular radio station. That is the consumer's tastes may be more eclectic than a particular genre. Have a look at the variety of genres on DAB+: 80s, 90s, country rock, classic rock, country rock and various dance stations.
Have a look at the ratings for radio stations and note that in the 1970s, 98% of the audience was explained by listening to radio. In recent years up to three years ago, it was 87%. Today it's 84% of listening to radio. The other 16% may be for non-participants in the ratings system.
Second, we cannot assume that "Brand X" of a particular station is the same nationally. Sydney's audience is different to Perth's audience. The ranking of "Brand X" is not the same for each capital city. It may well be wrong to make the assumption that same proportion of people in Sydney listen to "Brand X" when clearly it is not in Perth. Have a look at the ratings and you will notice that "Brand X", "Brand Y" and "Brand Z" do not necessarily follow in Sydney as in Perth or any capital city market.
Thank you,
Anthony of think about the strategy and not make assumptions that all markets are the same, Belfield in the land of the Wangal and Darug Peoples of the Eora Nation